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The Effect of a Reasoning Warning on Faking in  
Personality Testing for Selection and the Perception of Procedural Justice 
T. Ryan Dullaghan 
ABSTRACT 
A major concern with using personality tests in the selection process is the 
prevalence of applicant faking behavior which can influence the rank order of applicants 
such that fakers are hired at an elevated frequency. This study examined the effects of the 
detection/consequence warning and a more applicant-friendly warning on faking and 
perceived procedural justice. I hypothesized that a positive warning (reasoning warning) 
and a detection/consequence warning would show similar mean personality trait levels 
compared to honest responses, with all means showing less socially desirable responding 
than no warning prompt. Results suggested that the detection/consequence warning is 
more effective at reducing faking behavior in the selection context, and the content of the 
warning has no impact on perceived procedural justice. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
Utilizing personality tests in the selection process has become increasingly 
popular over the past decade and a half since the development of the five-factor model of 
personality and research showing the validity of the five-factor model in predicting job 
performance, organizational status, income, and a number of other variables (Barrick & 
Mount, 1991; Mount & Barrick, 1995; Judge, Higgins, Thoreson, & Barrick, 1999; Tett, 
Jackson, & Rothstein, 1991). In the early 1990s, meta-analyses demonstrated the 
robustness of the Big Five personality factors of neuroticism, extraversion, openness to 
experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Tett et al., 
1991). Not only have some of these personality traits been shown to predict job 
performance, but personality can show high incremental validity above general mental 
ability (GMA) in the prediction of job performance (Mount, Witt, & Barrick, 2000; 
Schmidt & Hunter, 1998) compared to other selection procedures. Furthermore, unlike 
GMAs, personality tests used for selection show little to no bias based on age, race, or 
gender (Hough, Oswald, & Ployhart, 2001). Unfortunately, personality data can be faked 
much more easily than other components of a selection battery (Donovan, Dwight, & 
Hurtz, 2003).  
Faking is intentionally distorting responses on a personality test so as to appear 
higher or lower on a trait than the respondent’s true trait score (McFarland & Ryan, 
2000). In most cases where respondents are motivated to distort their responses 
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(selection, assessment, classification), faking so as to appear less desirable may not be a 
serious issue, so most research on the topic has focused on faking in the positive direction 
(Jones & Abraham, 2008). 
Warning prompts have been shown to be effective methods for reducing applicant 
faking on personality tests. There is, however, evidence that applicants have a negative 
perception of personality tests being used in the selection process (Rosse, Miller, & 
Stecher, 1994), and adding a warning prompt appears to also elicit a negative response 
from applicants (McFarland, 2003). McFarland did not, however, compare unwarned 
conditions to the warned conditions.  
Little research has examined the target of the applicant’s negative perceptions, but 
the selection system (Rosse et al., 1994) and the organization (McFarland, 2003) have 
been hypothesized to be potential targets. If currently used warnings do, in fact, harm 
applicant perceptions of an organizational application process, these applicants could 
potentially withdraw from the selection process, tell other prospective employees not to 
apply to the organization, and/or enter the organization with a negative view of the 
organization’s justice. New types of warnings that seek to improve applicant perceptions 
of procedural justice could potentially mitigate the effects of including a personality test 
in the selection battery. The purpose of this study is to examine the influence of a more 
applicant-friendly warning on faking, as well as see if such a warning will improve 
applicant perceptions of the use of a personality test in selection.  
Faking Behavior 
 Presumably, applicants for a job are motivated to show themselves to be a 
relatively ideal candidate for the organization. As such, applicants could be tempted to 
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distort their responses toward some conception of the type of person who best fits a given 
job. Many studies have found higher (more socially desirable) personality trait group 
means for faking groups than control/non-faking groups (Barrick & Mount, 1996; Hough, 
1998; Rosse, Stecher, Miller, & Levin, 1998). Typically, this distortion is referred to as 
faking, but various researchers have called it impression management, response 
distortion, intentional distortion, social desirability, and dissimulation (McFarland & 
Ryan, 2000).  
In a sample of recent job applicants, Donovan et al. (2003) assessed the base rate 
of applicant faking. The researchers created a survey asking participants whether or not 
they had engaged in 29 faking activities during a recent job application process. 
Responses showed that participants tended to fake the personality components of the 
selection process more often than other components. Participants reported faking on 
components relating to personality 27.8% to 53.8% of the time versus only 4.7% to 9.5% 
for the biographical components. The aspects of personality addressed included 
hardworking, prompt, and thorough (45.2%), dependability and reliability (29%), 
agreeableness (27.8%), and downplaying negative attributes (53.8%). Biographical data 
showed a much lower prevalence of faking – outright made up information (9.5%), listed 
unearned rewards (4.7%), and exaggerated experience (7.7%).  Thus it appears that 
faking in personality testing may occur in a meaningful proportion of the job applicant 
population.  
There is still debate as to the effects of faking on the validity of personality 
measures in employee selection (Barrick & Mount, 1996; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; 
Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton, 2003; Ones, Viswesvaran & Reiss, 1996). 
4 
Topping & O’Gorman (1997) found that for all Big Five traits but Agreeableness, 
intentionally faked responses significantly decreased the validity of responses to the 
NEO-FFI when compared to personality ratings from friends or family. On the other 
hand, in a study using two applicant samples, Barrick and Mount (1996) found that when 
correcting for response distortion, criterion-related validities against voluntary turnover 
and job performance decreased, but not a significant amount. The validities were similar 
despite the finding that the structural models correcting for either self-deception or 
impression management fit better than the unadjusted model. In a meta-analysis of the 
social desirability literature, Ones et al. (1996) found similar results regarding the 
robustness of criterion-related validities, as have others (Hough, 1998; Hough, Eaton, 
Dunnette, Kamp, & McCloy, 1990).  
There is much evidence, however, that faking responses can change the rank order 
of candidates. In selection scenarios with low selection ratios, this rank order is what will 
determine who gets hired and who does not. Mueller-Hanson et al. (2003) simulated the 
applicant process to examine the criterion-related validity and rank-order effects of 
faking. For a control condition, there were no differences in the predictor-criterion 
relationships among three achievement motivation subgroups (low, middle, and high 
achievement motivation). For the faking condition, however, the personality-performance 
relationship for the lower (r = .45) and upper thirds (r = .07) were significantly different. 
Further, the applicants selected based on their rank-order on the non-cognitive measure 
were consistently composed of more from the faking group than the control group. As the 
selection ratio decreased, the proportion of faking group members selected increased, and 
thus the error in selection. An increase in the error in selection due to faking has been 
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found consistently in other research looking at the effect of faking on rank-order 
(Ellingson, Sackett, & Hough, 1999; Hough, 1998; Komar, Brown, Komar, & Robie, 
2008; Rosse et al., 1998). 
 There is evidence that faking affects the psychometric properties of personality 
tests such that the Five-Factor structure does not always fit faked responses. Schmit and 
Ryan (1993) hypothesized that personality factor structure would depend on the purpose 
of the test administration. Two such conditions include a simple for-research-only 
examination of personality, or as used in a selection battery. Results showed that the Five 
Factor structure fit better for student (voluntary) samples than applicant (involuntary) 
samples. In the applicant sample, an “ideal-employee factor” (Schmit and Ryan, 1993, 
pp. 971) appeared in the factor analysis, reflecting several work-related traits. The 
authors believe the NEO-FFI’s five broad personality traits may not be accurately applied 
in employee selection. Furthermore, the subscales of the NEO-FFI showed complex 
loading patterns, so these subscales should also be used cautiously when assessing 
applicant responses.  
 Smith, Hanges, and Dickson (2001), on the other hand, found no changes in factor 
structure using the HPI between student, applicant, and incumbent samples. Marshall, de 
Fruyt, Rolland, and Bagby (2005) similarly found that the factor structure on the NEO-
PI-R remained stable across applicant and non-applicant groups. Unexpectedly, in Smith 
et al.’s (2001) study, the model fit the applicant sample better than the student sample, in 
disagreement with Schmit and Ryan’s (1993) findings. Unfortunately, I have found no 
further studies seeking to resolve the differences between Schmit and Ryan and Smith et 
al.’s findings.  
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 Potential inconsistency of factor structures has serious implications for the utility 
of personality tests in the selection setting. Consider conscientiousness, the trait most 
often found to be related to job performance across occupations. If items used in creating 
the composite conscientiousness score do not fit in the conscientiousness latent factor, the 
inclusion of such items may introduce noise into the predictor-criterion relationship, thus 
reducing this relationship.  
The Utility of Warnings 
As alluded to above, items on most personality tests are somewhat transparent. On 
most measures, a general knowledge of the Big-Five model will enable respondents to 
identify which trait each item reflects, and therefore determine how to fake their 
responses to the item, should they choose to do so. Rees and Metcalfe (2003) found that 
36% of participants thought it was easy to fake on a personality questionnaire, and 
another 36% did not find faking unethical. Wolford and Christiansen (2008) approached 
the fakeability issue from a slightly different perspective. With the increasing popularity 
of personality measures being used in the workplace, books have appeared that coach 
readers on how to fake personality tests. In the Wolford and Christiansen study, the 
authors provided some participants with sections of a book that coached readers how to 
improve their scores on a personality test; another group did not receive this material. 
During the testing session, all participants were told to respond to the personality test as if 
they were applying for a car salesman position. Results showed that those who read the 
coaching materials did show higher mean scores for extraversion and conscientiousness 
than those who did not receive the coaching materials. The results suggest that with 
knowledge of what a personality test is asking for, and the motivation to fake, 
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participants can distort their responses in such a way as to increase their overall scores on 
the test.  
There has been a great deal of research the past decade or so looking into how to 
reduce such distortion. Although faking has been found to affect applicant rank-order and 
the scale’s psychometric properties (as discussed above), researchers have developed 
methods for dealing with applicant faking behavior. Warnings have been shown to 
effectively reduce the prevalence of faking in the application process (Dwight & 
Donovan, 2003). For many personality traits, mean scores for the warned conditions were 
significantly lower than for the unwarned condition. However, a recent study comparing 
honest, faked, and warned groups suggests that warning the applicant not to fake may not 
reduce test scores down to the same level as the honest condition (Donovan, Dwight, & 
Schneider, 2008). Research needs to be conducted looking more precisely at how 
warnings impact personality test scores.  
McFarland and Ryan (2000) provided a model of the applicant faking process to 
describe the way variables interact to create variance in faking on non-cognitive 
measures. First in the model are influences on beliefs toward faking, including values, 
morals, religion, personality traits, etc. These influences then affect an individual’s 
beliefs toward faking, which in turn determine an individual’s intention to fake. The 
relationship between beliefs toward faking and intention to fake, however, is moderated 
by situational influences such as desire for the job and warnings. Intention to fake’s 
relationship with faking behavior is moderated by both the ability to fake (self-
monitoring, knowledge of the construct being measured, and item transparency) and the 
opportunity to fake. Opportunity to fake addresses the limitation for fakers that those 
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already high on the trait may not be able to positively distort their responses. Finally, the 
model asserts faking behavior will influence a number of outcomes including validities, 
test scores, scale reliabilities, and the factor structure. Although the model has not yet 
been tested in its entirety, it does provide a framework from which researchers can 
examine the expected effects of warnings on faking behavior.  
Pace and Borman (2006) summarized five types of warnings that could be used to 
reduce applicant faking. First is the detection warning, in which test takers are informed 
that faked responses can be detected. Second is the consequence warning, which refers to 
the test administrator explaining the penalty a respondent will receive for faking his or 
her responses. Independently, these two warnings appear to have little effect on the 
prevalence of faking. Combined, however, they have been shown to be effective at 
reducing trait mean scores (Dwight & Donovan, 2003). In the Dwight and Donovan 
study, the condition in which the detection warning was paired with the consequence 
warning elicited lower mean scores (reduced faking) compared to the unwarned 
condition, detection warning-only condition, and consequence-only condition. The 
detection/consequence warning has had the most wide-spread use in the warning 
literature.  
The moral conviction warning appeals to the applicant’s sense of right and wrong. 
Upon reading, it presumably brings to mind associations of honesty with appropriate 
behavior and positive self-image, which may reduce faking levels as well.  
Another approach to reducing faking, although not necessarily considered a 
warning, is the for-research-only prompt. Essentially, the for-research-only prompt 
explains why personality tests are used in selection, and how accurate responses aide in 
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improving the selection process. The administrator explains that a person’s responses will 
not be tied to the person’s name or any other identifying information, nor will responses 
affect the respondent in any way. Responses from this approach, since applicants will 
have a decreased motivation to fake, are presumably closer to their true personality 
scores.  
Lastly, there is the reasoning warning, the “let’s reason together” approach (Pace, 
Borman, Penney, Xu, & Bearden, 2005). This warning appeals to test-taker interests 
rather than the consequences of faking. In a friendly tone, the warning points out that it 
may not be in the test-taker’s best interest to fake his or her responses because dishonest 
responses may result in the respondent being classified into jobs he or she is not best 
suited for. It continues by pointing out that incorrect classification may result in 
performance problems and a lack of job fit. The researchers developed this instruction 
prompt for use in a military setting, where test takers will be classified into jobs based on 
the test results. In the typical organizational selection context, the reasoning warning 
would need to be rephrased to reflect conditions of being offered the job (or not) while 
still maintaining the friendly, helpful tone.  
The reasoning warning appeals to many levels of McFarland and Ryan’s (2000) 
model of faking. The warning could affect beliefs toward faking in that it should increase 
the belief that faking is not useful and faking will not help the applicant reach his or her 
goals. Further, the warning may make the applicant realize that he or she does not fit the 
job, based on the personality traits needed to be successful and satisfied in the job. Lastly, 
with a decreased belief in the effectiveness of faking, there will be a decreased intention 
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to fake. It is also possible, however, that such a warning could inform an applicant that it 
is possible to fake responses, thereby leading to an increase in faking behavior. 
Pace et al. (2005) conducted the only study I am aware of utilizing the reasoning 
warning. Although the study was terminated before all data were collected, preliminary 
results showed promise for the reasoning warning. Based on the available data, there 
were no significant mean differences between personality scores on a number of 
personality traits for the detection/consequence warning condition, reasoning warning 
condition, and for-research-only condition. Due to the early termination of the Pace et al. 
(2005) study, however, the researchers were unable to compare the means from the three 
warning conditions with those of an unwarned group.  
Procedural Justice 
Procedural justice has been defined as the fairness of the procedures that are used 
to determine organizational outcomes (Lind & Tyler, 1988). There is much evidence that 
applicants tend to have negative perceptions of the use of personality measures in the 
selection process because personality tests are not seen as directly relevant to the job 
itself (Holtz, Ployhart, & Dominguez, 2005; Gilliland, 1993; Gilliland, 1994). The 
content of a personality test is not closely related to the content of the job, and it is not 
clear to most people what the relationship is between personality traits and job outcomes.  
Gilliland (1993) attempted to integrate the literature on applicant perceived 
procedural justice in the selection context by proposing a model of applicant reactions to 
employment selections systems. While the model attempts to explain applicant reactions 
to the entire selection process, I will focus only on the parts of the model relating to the 
testing itself, where personality testing can best fit. Gilliland identifies four procedural 
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rules relating to the formal characteristics of the selection process – job relatedness, 
opportunity to perform, reconsideration opportunity, and consistency. Job relatedness is 
the extent to which the test itself appears to be related to the job content and could be a 
valid predictor of job performance. The opportunity to perform refers to the applicant 
having a say in the information used for the selection decision. The reconsideration 
opportunity rule refers to the applicant’s opportunity to challenge the decision process. 
Specifically, applicants need to be able to view their scores and understand the scoring 
process. Finally, the consistency of administration rule refers to the need for applicants to 
believe that all applicants were treated fairly and equally in the selection process. Other 
rules relevant to the selection battery itself include honesty and the propriety of questions. 
Honesty is the truthfulness the organization shows when communicating with applicants. 
The propriety of questions refers to items being appropriate and not showing prejudice. 
Combined, the above rules interact to influence the applicant’s overall opinion of the 
organization’s selection process.  
Gilliland tested certain components of his proposed model in a later study 
(Gilliland, 1994). He found that perceived procedural justice was higher for applicants 
whose selection procedures were viewed as most relevant to their job. He manipulated 
the relevance of the testing procedure to the job by having groups of participants take 
different tests (a work sample test, a cognitive ability test, or an overt integrity test). He 
found that the work sample test was seen as most relevant to the future job, whereas the 
integrity test was seen as the least relevant. Further, participants completing the work 
sample test held the greatest perception of procedural justice, whereas those completing 
the overt integrity test held the lowest.  
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Using a threat (in the form of a detection/consequence warning) in the application 
process can negatively influence the applicant’s perception of the organization (Gilliland, 
1993; McFarland, 2003). McFarland (2003) examined the direct effect of the 
detection/consequence warning on applicant’s perception of procedural justice. She 
outlined a number of ways warnings can negatively affect applicant perceptions of the 
selection process. First, she pointed out that the detection warning could make applicants 
feel that the organization is not allowing them to perform to as high a degree as possible. 
Second, a detection warning informs applicants that the test can, indeed, be faked. As 
such, applicants could believe that the measure would not accurately predict anything 
about a future employee’s performance. Third, including items that assess dishonesty in 
the personality test could be considered an unwarranted invasion of privacy.  
McFarland hypothesized that a warning which explains that a measure of social 
desirability is within the scale, and explains what the scale will be used for, will improve 
applicant perceptions of the selection process. Although means on multiple components 
of procedural justice for the warned group were lower, the differences were non-
significant, suggesting that warnings had little effect on perceived procedural justice. 
However, McFarland points out that the use of personality tests in selection is perceived 
negatively overall, as seen in low mean scores on measures of procedural justice. Other 
research has supported the notion that including a personality test in a selection battery 
produces negative applicant reactions (Rosse et al., 1994; Steiner & Gilliland, 1996), and 
Rees and Metcalfe (2003) found a quarter of participants thought personality 
questionnaires could not effectively predict job performance, suggesting these personality 
tests violate a number of procedural justice rules.  
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As addressed above, Pace and Borman (2006) proposed the reasoning warning as 
a more applicant-friendly approach to reducing faking. The use of the reasoning warning 
could improve perceptions of procedural justice in the use of personality tests for 
selection by explaining to respondents that honest answers do, in fact, make personality 
measurement effective and honest answers are in their own best interests. The 
detection/consequence warning could have shown no effect on perceived procedural 
justice in McFarland’s (2003) study because it did not directly address any of Gilliland’s 
(1993) procedural justice rules. Logically, explaining the reasons behind including the 
personality test in the selection battery, and honesty from the organization can improve 
applicant perceptions of procedural justice through Gilliland’s job relatedness and 
honesty rules (as discussed above). Related to the McFarland and Ryan (2000) model, the 
reasoning warning could also reduce the intention to fake due to a desire to reciprocate 
with honesty and fairness to the organization. In sum, the reasoning warning could 
potentially improve applicant perceptions of procedural justice through addressing 
several procedural justice rules.  
Identifying Faking 
 Several methods for detecting faking and dealing with its effects have been 
proposed in the research. Below, I will briefly summarize three approaches – self-
presentation or direct evidence, mean comparisons, and variance comparisons.  
Self-Presentation/Direct Evidence 
 Some personality measures have items built into them meant to identify fakers. 
Using one or more of these methods, statistical correction can be made to obtain an 
adjusted score for applicants (Ellingson et al., 1999). However, these statistical 
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corrections have not shown improved validity (Barrick & Mount, 1996; Mueller-Hanson 
et al., 2003). Alternatively, researchers have attempted to identify faking and honest 
groups based on a median split on impression management scales. Stark, Chernyshenko, 
Chan, Lee and Drasgow (2001) examined the psychometric properties of a number of 
personality scales using IRT differential item functioning (DIF) analysis, with honest and 
faking groups determined through such a median split. They found that fewer items 
showed DIF using the median split on an impression management measure compared to 
data from applicant and non-applicant samples. They concluded that due to DIF and 
differential test functioning, the scale might measure different underlying constructs for 
applicant and non-applicant samples. As such, this median split should not be applied to 
the analysis and interpretation of personality data.  
Rosse et al. (1998) controlled for response distortion using an impression 
management scale. They found that the rank order of applicants was very different 
between controlled and uncontrolled applicant personality scores, especially at the top of 
the distribution, where employment decisions at smaller selection ratios will be made. 
While controlling for social desirability has been used in an attempt to decrease the 
effects of faking on selection, researchers are not entirely clear if controlling for social 
desirability or impression management actually reflects the individual’s true personality.  
Ellingson et al. (1999) compared honest and corrected applicant scores in a 
within-subjects study. They had participants take a personality test twice, once under an 
honest condition, and once under a “fake good” condition, then obtained corrected scores 
by correcting the “fake good” scores for intentional distortion using a social desirability 
scale. Although correcting for distortion did bring group mean scores for the faking group 
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down to the level of honest condition means, the correlations between honest and 
corrected scores were low (r = .09-.26). To assess the effect of correcting scores on 
selection, Ellingson et al. created a series of selection scenarios based on mock-applicant 
personality test scores then examined which participants would be selected using a top-
down selection procedure using each person’s true and corrected scores. The authors 
considered a correct selection decision to have occurred when applicants who were 
selected based on their honest scores were also selected with their corrected scores. In 
some scenarios, social desirability corrections improved the proportion of applicants 
correctly selected. In other scenarios, corrections had no effect or reduced the proportion 
correctly selected. Consequently, it is possible that applicant rankings based on corrected 
personality scores may not result in true-score rankings. Thus, a social desirability 
measure may not be the most effective method for identifying or controlling for applicant 
faking behaviors.  
Some researchers maintain that social desirability may reflect valid personality-
related variances (Ellingson et al., 1999; Ones et al., 1996) and should not be used to 
correct personality scores. Furthermore, there is a body of research that has looked at the 
effectiveness of adding a frame of reference to the personality measure. For example, 
Schmit, Ryan, Stierwalt, and Powell (1995) added a school context to each item on a 
Conscientiousness scale. They found increased validity for all Conscientiousness 
subscales using a school frame of reference in predicting performance relative to college 
GPA, as compared to the scale with no frame of reference. Hunthausen, Truxillo, Bauer, 
and Hammer (2003) found similar results using a work-place sample and job 
performance criterion. Both studies’ results suggest that socially desirable responding can 
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reflect true work performance, assuming the applicant does exhibit the reported behaviors 
at work, even though his or her personality-based behaviors outside the work context may 
be notably different.  
Mean Comparisons 
 The most common method for identifying faking is the mean comparison method 
using a between-subjects design (see Birkeland, Manson, Kisamore, Brannick, & Smith, 
2006 meta-analysis) (Barrick & Mount, 1996; Dwight & Donovan, 2003; McFarland, 
2003; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Rosse et al., 1998). As addressed above, considerable 
research has found a statistical increase in average scores for faking groups (Barrick & 
Mount, 1996; Hough, 1998). Researchers have used a number of methods to identify or 
create the faking group used in these mean comparisons. In some studies using non-
applicant samples, participants have been given a reward for “getting” the job (financial 
incentives). Others have instructed participants to intentionally distort their responses so 
they get the job. In one study, McFarland (2003) simply asked if applicants lied on the 
test to increase their scores.  
For applicant samples, some researchers have presumed that applicants are 
motivated to fake their responses to make the best impression they can, whereas an 
incumbent sample should show much less faking behavior (Rosse et al., 1998). Hogan, 
Barrett, and Hogan (2007) took a different approach. Applicants completed a personality 
test during an initial employment process. The majority of applicants were not offered 
jobs. Six months later, many of those who did not previously receive a job offer reapplied 
to the same organization. Hogan et al. suggested that these re-applicants would be more 
17 
highly motivated to get the job the second time around, although they did not find support 
for this supposition.  
 Regardless of the method used to induce or discourage faking, the analyses are 
simple – compare group means on individual personality traits between the faking and 
non-faking groups and examine the effect sizes to evaluate differences.  
Variance 
 For some of the most popular personality tests, such as the NEO-PI-R and NEO-
FFI (Costa & McCrae, 1992) participants respond to the personality measure using a five-
point Likert scale according to how much they agree the items describe them. Assuming 
applicants want the job, responses may be positively distorted, and moving responses 
toward the “five” mark will reduce the response variance, so faking groups should be 
expected to show less variance than an honest group.  
 Also, some researchers have found that applicants distort their responses to a 
different extent on different personality variables (McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Rosse et al., 
1998). These findings suggest that applicants view certain personality traits as more 
relevant to the job than others, demonstrating another source of variance in faking 
conditions. Identifying a faking group based on different variances, however, would be 
difficult to argue. Furthermore, comparing variance would do little to help identify 
individual fakers. The value in comparing variance between conditions would be to 
suggest there are different treatment effects between groups.  
Summary 
 Presumably, when applicants are within the selection context, they will want to 
present the most favorable impression of themselves. While the composition of the Big 
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Five personality traits vary depending on the measure, all seek to assess five similar, 
recognizable traits. When distorting responses, the applicant who is trying to appear more 
favorable than other applicants would likely respond more highly on items related to 
Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness, and less high on items 
related to Neuroticism.  
 In sum, although evidence suggests that faking on a personality test does not 
seriously affect criterion-related validities for a number of important organizational 
outcomes, faking does affect the rank-order of job candidates, especially near the top of 
the score distribution. Furthermore, the inclusion of a personality measure in the selection 
process can negatively influence perceptions of the selection process, and perhaps the 
organization. As such, I will test the effect of the reasoning warning in reducing the 
prevalence of faking and the perception of procedural justice. If the reasoning warning 
can be shown to be as effective as the detection/consequence warning at reducing 
applicant faking on a personality measure, and if the reasoning warning shows improved 
perceptions of procedural justice, then the reasoning warning could be argued to be the 
better warning prompt to use. I hypothesize that: 
 H1: A personality test with no warning will show higher mean scores for 
Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness than the for-research-
only (control) condition, the detection/consequence warning, and the reasoning warning, 
and lower mean scores for Neuroticism.  
 H2: A personality test with the detection/consequence warning or the reasoning 
warning will show no difference in mean scores from the for-research-only condition for 
any personality variables.  
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 H3: The perception of procedural justice in the reasoning warning condition will 
be higher than with the detection/consequence warning condition. 
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Chapter Two 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were recruited from two sources. The first sample (Nursing sample) 
came from nurses working in the medical field in Louisville, Ky. The other source was 
undergraduate students in psychology courses at a southeastern United States public 
university (Student sample). I obtained responses from 267 nursing participants (89.5% 
female, 9% male, 1.5% missing). Ages ranged from 18 to 58 (M = 25.63; SD = 6.51). The 
majority of the nursing participants were White/Caucasian (82.8%), with 13.5% 
Black/African American, .7% Asian/Pacific Islander, .4% Native American, and 2.6% 
Other/Mixed Race.  
I obtained 155 responses from the Student sample. Two responses showed 
uniform responding throughout, and two more responses were completed in around one 
minute (96 items), which was two minutes shorter than the next response time, so 151 
responses were included in the analyses (79.5% female, 20.5% male). Ages ranged from 
18 to 42 (M = 21.75, SD = 3.64). The majority of Student participants were 
White/Caucasian (49.7%), with 19.9% Black/African American, 17.2% Hispanic/Latino, 
7.3% Asian/Pacific Islander, and 6% Other/Mixed Race. This sample was employed in a 
number of industries including the medical industry (30.5%), retail/service industry 
(17.9%), and professional industries (15.2%), among others, with 25.2% unemployed.  
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As I have no expectations for differences between groups based on gender, race, 
tenure, employment status, etc., there were no exclusionary criteria for participants in 
either sample. I collected no identifying information above basic demographics from 
participants. No compensation was given to participants, and participation was 
completely voluntary for both samples.  
Measures 
 Warning Prompts: Participants received one of four instruction prompts. In order 
to create a control condition with honest responses, the for-research-only condition 
(Honest condition) differed from the other conditions. Participants in the for-research-
only condition were presented with only the following paragraph preceding the 
personality test:  
For-research-only condition (Honest condition):  
You are about to take a personality test. As you answer the following questions, 
please be as honest as you can. Your responses will be used for research purposes 
only. There will be no identifying information kept with your responses, and all 
responses will be kept strictly confidential. Honest answers will help us to get an 
idea of the typical person’s true personality.  
Participants in the other three conditions (no warning, detection/consequence 
warning, and reasoning warning) were told to pretend they are a job applicant trying to 
get a job in the field of nursing. They were also told the personality test they were about 
to take would be a key part of the job selection process. This general instruction prompt 
was included in the remaining three forms: 
General instruction prompt:  
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Pretend you are a job applicant trying to get your ideal job in the field of nursing. 
The personality test you are about to take is a very important part of the job 
selection process, so it is important that you do well. Please respond to the test as 
you would if you were applying for this job. The test will be used in the decision to 
hire all job candidates. 
The Detection/Consequence and Reasoning warnings then followed the general 
instruction prompt with their respective warnings:  
Detection/Consequence warning:  
Please be aware of the following two points: 
1. This test contains questions designed to identify those who slant their 
responses to make themselves look like a better candidate than they are. 
Research has shown that these questions are an effective way of identifying 
individuals who provide inaccurate information about themselves. 
2. Dishonest or distorted self-descriptions will invalidate your results. In other 
words, faking will result in your not being considered for the job.  
Reasoning warning:  
This test has been designed to find job candidates who will be most successful and 
happy in this job. Please respond honestly to the following questions. Those who 
respond dishonestly may find themselves in jobs they are not well suited for, 
which may in turn result in poor performance and dissatisfaction with the job, so 
it is in your own best interest to answer the following questions honestly. 
 Personality Test: I used the International Personality Item Pool (IPIP) (Goldberg 
et al., 2006; Appendix A) as my personality assessment tool. The IPIP has 10 items for 
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each Big Five trait (50 items total); Neuroticism (α = .84) (“Often feel blue”), 
Extraversion (α = .84) (“Feel comfortable around people”), Openness to Experience (α = 
.62) (“Have a vivid imagination”), Agreeableness (α = .75) (“Have a good word for 
everyone”), and Conscientiousness (α = .84) (“Am always prepared”). The IPIP items 
included in assessment of the Big Five traits were selected based on rank-ordered 
correlations with scores on the NEO PI-R. The items showing the highest correlations 
with each trait were selected to be included in the measure. The developers performed a 
visual content analysis to identify items that addressed the same issue. If they found two 
items that were too similar in content, they removed the item with the lower correlation, 
and the next item in the rank-order was included. Responses are on a five-point Likert-
type scale, with anchors of 1 = Very Inaccurate, 3 = Neither Inaccurate nor Accurate, and 
5 = Very Accurate. 
 Procedural Justice: I used a modified version of Colquitt’s (2001) Procedural 
Justice Questionnaire (PJQ; Appendix B). Colquitt created the items based on 
Leventhal’s (1980) procedural justice rules. The phrasing of some of the original items 
referred to a present outcome rather than the current selection process, so I made tense 
and small phrasing changes to make the items fit the current study’s testing situation. A 
sample item includes “Have you had an influence over the outcome arrived at by these 
procedures?” The measure is a seven-item scale with a five-point Likert-type response 
with anchors 1 = to a small extent, and 5 = to a large extent. Internal consistency 
reliability is high, α = .83. 
I also used certain subscales of Bauer et al.’s (2001) Selection Procedural Justice 
Scale (SPJS; Appendix C). Since the focus of this study is on the applicant perception of 
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procedural justice regarding the use of a personality test in the selection process and the 
use of various warnings, I am only including the subscales relating to the test itself. The 
included subscales are job-relatedness – predictive (“A person who scored well on this 
test will be a good nurse,” α = .83), chance to perform (“I was able to show what I can do 
on this test,” α = .91), propriety of questions (“The test itself did not seem too personal or 
private,” α = .78), and job-relatedness content (“The content of the test was clearly 
related to the nursing job,” α = .93). The included subscales have 11 items total, with a 
high reliability of α = 84.  
Impression Management: I have also included the Impression Management (IM) 
subscale of Paulhus’s Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) (Paulhus, 
1991; Appendix D). Paulhus defines impression management as intentionally changing 
behavior for an audience. While much research has shown that accounting for variance in 
responding to personality tests in the selection context based on social desirability does 
not bring individual scores do the “honest” level, social desirability scales are still often 
used in personality research. The measure is a 20 item scale with a seven-point Likert-
type response with anchors 1 = Not True, 4 = Somewhat True, and 7 = Very True. 
Reliability for the IM scale was found to be moderate, α = .77.  
Procedure 
 I collected data from the Nursing sample in a series of testing sessions during two 
typical work days. Testing sessions ranged from early morning to late evening to cover 
multiple work shifts, with 13 to 56 participants in each session, for a total of eight 
sessions. The testing session involved a short introduction by the experimenter explaining 
that participation was entirely voluntary and no adverse outcome would result from them 
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deciding not to participate. Participants then read and signed the informed consent form, 
which was collected before distributing the surveys. After all consent forms had been 
collected, participants were given the experiment’s survey face down, instructed to read 
the survey instructions, and completed the measure. Once all participants had finished, 
the experimenter debriefed participants as to the purpose of the study, including a brief 
summary of previous research on warnings and revelation of the different warning 
prompts presented. Any remaining questions were also answered. Before ending the 
debriefing session, the experimenter asked participants not to discuss the study with any 
of their coworkers, so as not to compromise the manipulation.  
The Student sample completed the survey through the online data-collection 
SONA system. This system required participant to sign into the website, then select the 
study to participate in. They were asked to select “ok” to indicate their consent to 
participate. They were then directed to a digital version of the survey to complete. Due to 
restraints on the SONA system, data had to be collected from one condition at a time. The 
order of conditions collected was Reasoning Warning, Detection/Consequence Warning, 
Faking, then Honest.  
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Chapter Three 
Results 
 Many of the analyses below required supplementary tests to an omnibus statistic 
(ANOVA). In these cases, I used the Bonferroni procedure to control for Type I error. In 
the Bonferroni procedure, the alpha level (often .05) is divided by the number of post hoc 
analyses performed. For example, if five post hoc analyses are performed to an ANOVA, 
an alpha level of .01 would be used to test the post hoc tests for significance. Also, 
interpreting effect sizes, I used Cohen’s (1988) conventions of d = .2 as a small effect, d 
= .5 as a medium effect, and d = .8 as a large effect (Cohen, 1988).  
Comparison of Sources 
The first step in my data analyses was to examine participant responses for 
differences between the Nursing and Student samples using the multivariate MANOVA 
test with Source (Student or Nurse) and Survey (Reasoning, Detection/Consequence, 
Faking, Honest) as the independent variables, and all personality, justice, and impression 
management variables as the dependent variables. The MANOVA for Survey was 
significant, Wilk’s Λ = .86, F(36, 1158.94) = 1.74, p = .005. Follow-up ANOVAs 
suggested that differences could be found only for Neuroticism and Impression 
Management (Table 1). All other variables had low power (below .55), suggesting 
significant results may not have been detected.  
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Table 1 
 
Follow-up ANOVAs to Survey MANOVA: Full sample 
 
MS F p power 
Neuroticism 1.8 3.86 .010 .82 
Extraversion   .98 2.12 .097 .54 
Openness   .30 1.19 .314 .32 
Agreeableness   .55 2.02 .111 .52 
Conscientiousness   .17   .42 .736 .14 
PJQ   .06   .11 .957 .07 
SPJS   .47 1.19 .314 .32 
JR – Predict 1.88 2.15 .093 .55 
Perform   .16   .20 .895 .09 
Propriety 1.29 1.84 .139 .48 
JR – Content 2.38 2.27 .080 .57 
Impression Mgmt 2.34 3.74 .011 .81 
* Alpha level  = .05; results are for F(3, X), where X varies depending on sample size due to missing data. 
 
Table 2 
Follow-up ANOVAs to Source MANOVA: Full sample 
 
MS F p power 
Neuroticism 1.72   3.68 .056 .48 
Extraversion   .98   2.13 .145 .31 
Openness   .77   3.05 .081 .41 
Agreeableness 8.08 29.79 .000 .99 
Conscientiousness 9.61 24.62 .000 .99 
PJQ   .73   1.26 .263 .20 
SPJS   .01     .01 .915 .05 
JR – Predict 4.05   4.64 .032 .58 
Perform 1.71   2.23 .136 .32 
Propriety 3.83   5.45 .020 .64 
JR – Content 4.13   3.94 .048 .51 
Impression Mgmt 5.34   8.52 .004 .83 
* Alpha level  = .05; results are for F(3, X), where X varies depending on sample size due to missing data. 
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The MANOVA for Source was also significant, Wilk’s Λ = .84, F(12, 392) = 
6.25, p = .000. Follow-up ANOVAs suggested that differences could be found for 
Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Job Relatedness – Predictive, Propriety, Job 
Relatedness – Content, and Impression Management. As with the Survey follow-ups, all 
non-significant variables had low power of .48 or below (Table 2).  
There was no significant multivariate interaction between Survey and Source, 
Wilk’s Λ = .912, F(36, 1158.94) = 1.019, p = .439, power = .93.  
Since the Source analyses showed that there were several differences between 
variables due to the sample but the interaction was not significant, I decided to analyze 
Students and Nurses separately. M and SD for all variables by condition can be found in 
Tables 3 and 4, and bivariate correlations among variables by Source can be found in 
Tables 5 and 6). 
Personality  
 I had two hypotheses regarding the personality measures. I first hypothesized that 
responses from the Faking condition would show higher mean scores for Extraversion, 
Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness than the Honest, Faking, and 
Reasoning conditions, and lower mean scores for Neuroticism. I also hypothesized that 
the Honest condition would show no difference in mean scores from the Reasoning 
warning condition nor the Detection/Consequence condition. While there is a fair amount 
of support suggesting that the Detection/Consequence warning elicits responses that are 
consistently less socially desirable than the Faking condition, the remaining hypotheses 
are less clearly summarized.  
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Table 3 
Means and standard deviations for Nurse and Student samples for the IPIP 
    Nurse   Student 
Variable by Condition M SD   M SD 
Reasoning N = 65 
 
N = 38 
 
Neuroticism 2.32 .73 
 
2.66 .72 
 
Extraversion 3.61 .68 
 
3.47 .80 
 
Openness 3.48 .50 
 
3.66 .40 
 
Agreeableness 3.92 .54 
 
3.60 .53 
 
Conscientiousness 3.96 .64 
 
3.58 .61 
Detection/Consequence N = 67 
 
N = 37 
 
Neuroticism 2.49 .63 
 
2.61 .61 
 
Extraversion 3.47 .68 
 
3.42 .68 
 
Openness 3.35 .49 
 
3.50 .48 
 
Agreeableness 3.83 .54 
 
3.61 .53 
 
Conscientiousness 3.83 .54 
 
3.61 .53 
Faking N = 69 
 
N = 38 
 
Neuroticism 2.12 .64 
 
2.50 .68 
 
Extraversion 3.83 .62 
 
3.49 .67 
 
Openness 3.49 .52 
 
3.56 .44 
 
Agreeableness 4.07 .49 
 
3.69 .49 
 
Conscientiousness 4.13 .63 
 
3.49 .69 
Honest N = 66 
 
N = 38 
 
Neuroticism 2.77 .73 
 
2.48 .69 
 
Extraversion 3.57 .65 
 
3.72 .68 
 
Openness 3.53 .52 
 
3.50 .60 
 
Agreeableness 3.87 .54 
 
3.61 .50 
  Conscientiousness 3.74 .66   3.71 .67 
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Table 4 
Means and standard deviations for Nurse and Student Samples for procedural justice 
    Nurse   Student 
Variable by Condition M SD   M SD 
Reasoning N = 64 
 
N = 38 
 
PJQ 3.63  .84 
 
3.63  .73 
 
SPJS 2.66  .69 
 
2.59  .65 
 
Job Relatedness – Pred 2.27 1.00 
 
2.51  .86 
 
Perform 2.13  .92 
 
2.22  .86 
 
Propriety 3.88  .90 
 
3.48  .79 
 
Job Relatedness – 
Content 2.29  .99 
 
2.09 1.06 
Detection/Consequence N = 66 
 
N = 37 
 
PJQ 3.65  .75 
 
3.51  .73 
 
SPJS 2.60  .70 
 
2.52  .63 
 
Job Relatedness – Pred 2.25  .97 
 
2.36  .95 
 
Perform 2.18  .86 
 
2.23  .84 
 
Propriety 3.67  .95 
 
3.51  .83 
 
Job Relatedness – 
Content 2.16 .98 
 
1.77  .82 
Faking N = 68 
 
N = 38 
 
PJQ 3.66  .88 
 
3.53  .55 
 
SPJS 2.70  .56 
 
2.77  .52 
 
Job Relatedness – Pred 2.46  .87 
 
2.72  .93 
 
Perform 2.17  .80 
 
2.36  .77 
 
Propriety 3.85  .82 
 
3.61  .76 
 
Job Relatedness – 
Content 2.30 1.08 
 
2.39 1.27 
Honest N = 65 
 
N = 38 
 
PJQ 3.62  .80 
 
3.53  .61 
 
SPJS 2.65  .66 
 
2.72  .59 
 
Job Relatedness – Pred 2.19  .92 
 
2.39  .98 
 
Perform 2.16  .97 
 
2.36  .95 
 
Propriety 3.86  .87 
 
3.92  .69 
  
Job Relatedness - 
Content 2.28  .94   1.95 1.06 
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Table 5 
Intercorrelations among study variables: Nurse sample 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Neuroticism -- 
          2. Extraversion -.42 -- 
         3. Openness -.12  .15 -- 
        4. Agreeableness -.43  .15  .31 -- 
       5. Conscientiousness -.52  .17  .22 .47 -- 
      6. PJQ -.13  .03  .07 .22 .15 -- 
     7. SPJS -.09 -.01  .06 .14 .11 .39 -- 
    8. JR – Predict -.11  .01  .16 .13 .09 .19 .67 -- 
   9. Perform -.05 -.01  .02 .11 .06 .25 .85 .57 -- 
  10. Propriety -.09  .07  .08 .10 .13 .45 .58 .19 .22 -- 
 11. JR – Content -.01 -.12 -.08 .04 .05 .18 .64 .29 .44 .18 -- 
12. Impression 
Mgmt -.22 -.05  .05 .38 .42 .10 .14 .16 .12 .04 .07 
* Correlations at magnitude .12 and above are significant at the .05 level.  
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Table 6 
Intercorrelations among study variables: Student sample 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Neuroticism -- 
          2. Extraversion -.43 -- 
         3. Openness -.17  .15 -- 
        4. Agreeableness -.33  .17  .24 -- 
       5. Conscientiousness -.46  .32  .21  .29 -- 
      6. PJQ -.20  .17 -.01  .27  .31 -- 
     7. SPJS -.15  .02 -.03  .06  .03  .07 -- 
    8. JR – Predict -.08 -.01  .05  .03 -.03  .00 .69 -- 
   9. Perform -.02  .02 -.02 -.01  .02 -.07 .87 .58 -- 
  10. Propriety -.25  .14  .05  .19  .22  .37 .43 .07 .13 -- 
 11. JR – Content -.08 -.11 -.15 -.02 -.14 -.09 .62 .27 .45 -.03 -- 
12. Impression 
Mgmt -.24 -.02  .17  .48  .18  .06 .07 .09 .04 -.03 .09 
* Correlations at magnitude .17 and above are significant at the .05 level.
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To test my personality hypotheses, I performed a series of one-way ANOVAs 
with the survey form as the independent variable and the mean score for each of the five 
personality variables as the dependent variables. For the Nursing sample, one-way 
ANOVAs showed significant differences between condition means for Neuroticism, F(3, 
1) = 11.09, p = .000, power = .999, Extraversion, F(3, 1) = 3.81, p = .011, power = .814, 
Agreeableness, F(3, 1) = 2.69, p = .047, power = .650 and Conscientiousness, F(3, 1) = 
4.95, p = .002, power = .910, but not for Openness, F(3, 1) = 1.51, p = .212, power = .397 
(Table 5). I then followed each significant ANOVA with Tukey’s post-hoc tests based on 
my five planned comparisons. In order to control for Type 1 error, I used the Bonferroni 
procedure to set .01 as my significance criterion for each Tukey’s post-hoc test. A 
summary of all one-way ANOVAs and Tukey’s post-hoc tests can be found in Table 7. 
For Neuroticism, the mean for the Reasoning condition (M = 2.32, SD = .73) was 
significantly lower than the Honest condition (M = 2.77, SD = .73), p = .001, with a 
moderate effect size, d = -.62, and the Faking condition (M =  2.12, SD = .64) was 
significantly lower than the Honest condition, p = .008, d = .58. The Faking condition 
was also lower for the Detection/Consequence condition (M = 2.49, SD = .63), p = .000, 
d = .73.  
For Extraversion, the Detection/Consequence condition (M = 3.47, SD = .68) was 
significantly lower than the Faking condition (M = 3.83, SD = .62), p = .007, with a 
moderate effect size, d = .55. For Conscientiousness, the Faking condition (M = 4.13, SD 
= .63) was significantly greater than the Honest condition (M = 3.74, SD = .66), p = .002, 
d = .60. The comparison between the Detection/Consequence (M = 3.83, SD = .54) and 
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Faking conditions for Conscientiousness, p = .026, d = -.51, was excluded from 
interpretation because significance did not reach the .01 alpha level.  
The comparison between the Detection/Consequence (M = 3.83, SD = .54) and 
Faking (M = 4.07, SD = .49) conditions for Agreeableness, p = .042, d = -.47, was 
likewise excluded from interpretation.  
 I tested my second hypothesis, which hypothesized no differences between 
groups, by examining the effect sizes between the warned conditions and the Honest 
condition. For the Reasoning-Honest difference, Extraversion had a small effect size, d = 
.09. For Conscientiousness, however, the effect size was slightly larger, d = .34, and for 
Neuroticism, there was a significant difference between means, with a large effect size, d 
= .62. For the Detection/Consequence-Honest difference, Neuroticism had a moderate 
effect size, d = .41, but Extraversion and Conscientiousness had quite small effect sizes, d 
= .15 and d = .15. Overall, this hypothesis was supported for the Detection/Consequence-
Honest comparison, but there was not much support for the Reasoning-Honest 
comparison. Although effect sizes of magnitude .41 and .34 are large enough to be 
considered meaningful, the means did not differ significantly, so the differences could 
have been due to error.  
 For the Student sample, a one-way ANOVA showed no significant difference 
between condition means for Neuroticism, F(3,1) = .61, p = .612, power = .174, 
Extraversion, F(3,1) = 1.36, p = .256, power = .357, Openness, F(3,1) = .88, p = .452, 
power = .239, Agreeableness, F(3,1) = .23, p = .879, power = .092, nor 
Conscientiousness, F(3,1) = .78, p = .509, power = .214. As none of the one-way 
ANOVAs was significant, no post-hoc tests were performed.  
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Table 7 
Descriptive and ANOVA statistics with Tukey’s post hoc tests for the personality 
variables: Nurse Sample 
Variable by Condition F(3, 1)* p N M SD 
Tukey’s  
PHST* 
Neuroticism 11.09 .000 
    
 
Reasoning 
  
65  2.32
a
 .73 a = .001 
 
Detection/Consequence 
  
67  2.49
b
 .63 b = .008 
 
Faking 
  
69   2.12
bc
 .64 c = .000 
 
Honest 
  
66   2.77
ac
 .73 
 Extraversion 3.81 .011 
    
 
Reasoning 
  
65 3.61 .68 a = .007 
 
Detection/Consequence 
  
67  3.47
a
 .68 
 
 
Faking 
  
69  3.83
a
 .62 
 
 
Honest 
  
66 3.57 .65 
 Openness 1.51 .212 
    
 
Reasoning 
  
65 3.48 .50 ns 
 
Detection/Consequence 
  
67 3.35 .49 
 
 
Faking 
  
69 3.49 .52 
 
 
Honest 
  
66 3.53 .52 
 Agreeableness 2.69 .047 
    
 
Reasoning 
  
65 3.91 .54 a = .042 (ns) 
 
Detection/Consequence 
  
67  3.83
a
 .54 
 
 
Faking 
  
69  4.07
a
 .49 
 
 
Honest 
  
66 3.87 .54 
 Conscientiousness 4.95 .002 
    
 
Reasoning 
  
65 3.96 .64 a = .026 (ns) 
 
Detection/Consequence 
  
67  3.83
a
 .54 b = .002 
 
Faking 
  
69   4.13
ab
 .63 
   Honest     66  3.74
b
 .66   
* Significance for the one-way ANOVAs are at the .05 alpha level. Significance for the Tukey’s post-hoc 
test is at the .01 alpha level.  
36 
Procedural Justice  
I hypothesized that participant perceptions of procedural justice within this study 
would be greater for participants in the Reasoning condition than the 
Detection/Consequence condition. This hypothesis was not supported.  
I conducted independent samples t-tests to examine responses for differences 
between participant perceptions of procedural justice based on mean scores on Colquitt’s 
(2001) PJQ and Bauer et al.’s (2001) overall SPJS, as well as the individual subscales 
included in the SPJS (Job Relatedness – Predictive, Chance to Perform, Propriety of 
Questions, and Job Relatedness – Content). For Nurses, the mean perception of 
procedural justice did not differ between the Reasoning and Detection/Consequence 
conditions for any of the justice measures or subscales (M, SD and t-test statistics can be 
found in Table 8). Similarly, no differences between means were found for Students 
either (see Table 9). Contrary to my hypothesis, the mean perception of procedural justice 
did not differ between the Reasoning and Detection/Consequence conditions for any of 
the justice measures or subscales for neither Nurses nor Students.  
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Table 8 
Descriptive and t-test statistics for the procedural justice variables: Nurse sample 
Variable by Condition t* df p N M SD 
Colquitt’s PJQ -.15 128 .879 
   
 
Reasoning 
   
64 3.63 .84 
 
Detection/Consequence 
   
66 3.65 .75 
Bauer et al.’s SPJP  .51 129 .614 
   
 
Reasoning 
   
64 2.66 .69 
 
Detection/Consequence 
   
67 2.60 .70 
Job-Relatedness Predictive  .11 129 .911 
   
 
Reasoning 
   
64 2.27 1.00 
 
Detection/Consequence 
   
67 2.25 .97 
Perform -.37 129 .711 
   
 
Reasoning 
   
64 2.13 .92 
 
Detection/Consequence 
   
67 2.18 .86 
Propriety 1.29 129 .201 
   
 
Reasoning 
   
64 3.88 .90 
 
Detection/Consequence 
   
67 3.67 .95 
Job-Relatedness Content  .72 129 .470 
   
 
Reasoning 
   
64 2.29 .99 
  Detection/Consequence       67 2.16 .98 
* Significance for the independent samples t-tests are at the .05 alpha level.  
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Table 9 
Descriptive and t-test statistics for the procedural justice variables: Student sample 
Variable by Condition t* df p N M SD 
Colquitt’s PJQ  .71 73 .483 
   
 
Reasoning 
   
38 3.63  .73 
 
Detection/Consequence 
   
37 3.51  .73 
Bauer et al’s SPJP  .49 73 .626 
   
 
Reasoning 
   
38 2.59  .65 
 
Detection/Consequence 
   
37 2.52  .63 
Job-Relatedness Predictive  .71 73 .481 
   
 
Reasoning 
   
38 2.51  .86 
 
Detection/Consequence 
   
37 2.36  .95 
Perform -.06 73 .949 
   
 
Reasoning 
   
38 2.22  .86 
 
Detection/Consequence 
   
37 2.23  .84 
Propriety -.17 73 .869 
   
 
Reasoning 
   
38 3.48  .79 
 
Detection/Consequence 
   
37 3.51  .83 
Job-Relatedness Content 1.47 73 .146 
   
 
Reasoning 
   
38 2.09 1.06 
  Detection/Consequence       37 1.77   .82 
* Significance for the independent samples t-tests are at the .05 alpha level.  
Impression Management 
 Using an ANOVA, I also found no significant mean differences for the 
Impression Management scale for either the Nursing sample, F(3, 1) = 2.33, p = .075, nor 
the Student sample, F(3, 1) = 1.81, p = .148.  
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Chapter Four 
Discussion 
Personality 
 I hypothesized that responses from the Faking condition would show higher mean 
scores for Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness than the 
Honest, Detection/Consequence, and Reasoning conditions, and lower mean scores for 
Neuroticism. I also hypothesized that the Honest condition would show no difference in 
mean scores from the Reasoning warning condition nor the Detection/Consequence 
condition. Since the ANOVAs for the student sample showed no differences between any 
means, the following discussion will refer to the Nursing sample results, unless otherwise 
specified.  
My first hypothesis was partially for the Faking and Detection/Consequence 
comparison. The Faking condition elicited higher mean scores than the 
Detection/Consequence warning for Extraversion, and lower mean scores for 
Neuroticism. Also, there is some support for the Faking and Honest comparison. The 
Faking condition elicited higher mean scores than the Honest condition for 
Conscientiousness, and lower for Neuroticism. The second part of my hypotheses (that 
the Honest condition would show no significant difference in mean scores from the 
warned conditions) was supported for all but the Reasoning warning condition in 
Neuroticism, which was significantly higher than the honest mean. Examination of effect 
sizes revealed mostly small or negligible effects for both warnings, although the 
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Detection/Consequence-Honest difference approached a moderate effect size even though 
this difference was not statistically significant.  
 Consistent with previous research, these results suggest that the 
Detection/Consequence warning is an effective method for reducing applicant mean 
scores on a personality test within the job selection context because means were 
frequently lower than the Faking condition and did not differ from the Honest condition. 
The Reasoning warning, however, appears to be less effective. In fact, for Neuroticism, 
there is a significant difference between the Reasoning warning condition and the Honest 
condition, but no difference between the Reasoning condition and the Faking condition. 
Evidence thus suggests that a warning that the test administrators can identify those who 
distort their responses and threatening them with removing the applicants from the 
selection process if they do fake their responses is needed to significantly reduce 
applicant scores.  
Dwight and Donovan (2003) pointed out that there are other possible reasons 
mean scores are decreased in warned conditions compared to faking conditions. One 
reason they mentioned was that respondents could overcompensate in their responses so 
as to avoid being identified as a faker. My results do not support this alternative 
explanation for the effect of warnings on personality scores. Since I included both faking 
and honest conditions in my study, I was able to show that a detection/consequence 
warning prompt does result in mean scores significantly lower than faked scores, and also 
that these lower scores did not differ from honest scores.  
Unfortunately, the more applicant friendly warning was not as effective at 
reducing applicant faking behavior as a detection/consequence warning in this study’s 
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context. It is possible that utilizing a reasoning warning in the selection context actually 
undermined the attempt to decrease applicant faking. The warning indirectly informs 
respondents that they have a choice when responding to be honest or distort their 
responses. This could have made participants who had not considered distorting their 
responses aware that they could, resulting in an increase in faking behavior for some 
respondents.  Rees and Metcalfe (2003) found that a significant proportion of respondents 
said they had no problem faking during the application process, so informing applicants 
they have the opportunity to fake could result in increased faking behavior. 
 It is important to note that Pace et al. (2006) originally created this warning for 
use in a classification context in which applicants know they have a job, unlike this 
selection context. In that context, this warning may be more convincing to applicants. 
Accordingly, the reasoning warning might be used as a second-tier tool where 
organizations use the personality test’s results to place the applicant in a best-fit job.  
Procedural Justice 
 I hypothesized that applicants in the Reasoning condition would perceive greater 
procedural justice than participants in the Detection/Consequence condition because of 
the more applicant-friendly tone of the Reasoning warning. My study shows no evidence 
of differences in perceptions of procedural justice between warning conditions. Perhaps 
the experimental manipulation did not replicate the selection context sufficiently to have 
participants form opinions about the fairness of the selection procedures.  
Similarly, applicants may not form attitudes about the selection process until after 
the decision to hire is made. I modified my procedural justice measures to focus on the 
selection process such that no knowledge of the outcome was necessary to respond to the 
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measures. If applicants do not form a strong opinion about the procedures used when 
applying for a job until the outcome is known, this study’s procedural justice measure 
could have missed the variance that would have been affected by utilizing different 
warnings. 
A final possibility is that despite McFarland’s (2003) findings, warnings on 
personality tests do not have any effect on applicant attitudes within the selection context. 
Rather, merely including a personality test in the selection battery could harm perceptions 
of procedural justice. I re-examined this study’s data to look for differences between any 
of the four conditions examined, but found no differences between conditions for any of 
the procedural justice variables. Like McFarland’s findings, participants in this study did 
report low perceptions of procedural justice (based on variable means, see Table 2), but 
of course, this is merely an observation, and more intensive research on applicant 
perceptions of personality tests should be performed.  
Impression Management 
I found no differences in self-reported impression management between the 
study’s four conditions. This could be because the measure was not affected by the 
instruction prompts, which was to be expected. Participants were informed that the test 
for selection ended after they completed the personality test. As such, applicants likely 
did not respond to the impression management measure in a job selection mindset. It is 
also possible that impression management is more stable than some other personality 
traits so that a person who is prone to impression management would be unaffected by 
different testing contexts. I want to note that my Nursing sample demonstrated quite a bit 
of resistance to answering this part of the survey. Some wrote comments on their 
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response surveys and the experimenter overheard several respondents say they thought 
the items were too invasive and inappropriate. Many left items throughout the scale 
blank. From a methodological standpoint, the testing site could have been an issue. Since 
Nurse participants took the survey in their place of work, self monitoring could have 
affected responses such that those who completed the measure responded favorably, 
rather than honestly. 
Limitations 
 The main limitation of this study is the limited generalizeability of results due to 
the context of the test administration. As already mentioned, since the surveys in this 
study were not part of a true selection process, participant’s responses may not reflect 
those that would be obtained in a high-stakes selection setting. However, the several 
significant mean differences between the Honest and Faking conditions of this study do 
show a difference in responses consistent with what previous research has shown 
between honest and faked responses, suggesting the results do simulate a real applicant 
setting, to an extent.   
 Another limitation relates to my Nursing sample. It is possible that the study’s 
warning prompts could have different effects on non-nursing samples, such as those 
working in finance, marketing, or government, for example. The lack of significant 
results within the Student sample could have been due to industry-specific impacts of the 
warnings. Since the student sample was composed of participants working in a variety of 
fields as well as some unemployed participants, there could have been too much noise to 
pick up on the effects of the warning prompts. I reanalyzed the student sample responses 
by respondents’ industry of employment (for those who were employed), but found no 
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significant mean comparisons. However, the small sample size of each condition within 
each industry (N < 11) limited the possibility of finding significant differences. Thus, this 
study’s results should be cautiously interpreted and applied outside the selection context 
for nurses.  
 Statistical power was also a concern in this study. Post hoc power tests showed 
Neuroticism, Extraversion, and Conscientiousness had sufficient power to detect 
significant differences (power > .80), but Openness to Experience and Agreeableness had 
low power for the nursing sample. Power was very low for all personality variables in the 
student sample, leaving open the possibility that I missed effects that were in the data. 
Reliability for all the measures used was acceptable, so increasing my sample size would 
be the only remaining way to improve power. Due to organizational constraints, I was 
limited in the number of participants I could include in my Nursing sample. For the 
Student sample, however, I obtained data for 100 more participants, without any changes 
in my substantive findings nor much improvement in power.  
Future Research 
 It would be interesting to see what effect the Detection/Consequence and 
Reasoning warnings would have in a real-world, high-stakes selection context. All four 
conditions could easily be inserted into a selection situation so applicants believed their 
responses would affect their chances of getting hired (but of course none could count in 
the selection process to ensure equitable treatment of applicants). Previous research 
included incentives within the study in an attempt to artificially create a selection context 
(the better applicants would receive money, for example). Awarding a financial incentive 
to the best performers in this study could have affected my findings. It is important to 
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remember, however, that the Honest and Faking manipulations did work as expected, so 
it is possible this study successfully simulated a selection context. An examination of the 
effect of financial or other incentives on results in a number of contexts would, however, 
benefit research on the contextual influences to responses to non-cognitive measures used 
for selection. Future research should also examine the effectiveness of a reasoning 
warning in reducing faking behavior in a classification context.  
 Byle and Holtgraves (2008) found that the type of design used had an effect on 
the magnitude of faking, with the between-subjects design having a smaller magnitude of 
faking than a within-subjects design when compared to honest scores. A within-subjects 
design where respondents complete two or more conditions would compliment this study 
in a number of ways. First, a within-subjects design would improve the likelihood of 
detecting significant experimental effects by increasing statistical power. Second, this 
design would permit control of pre-existing trait levels on the personality variables 
included, which I was unable to do. Third, within-subjects replication would examine 
whether the effects seen in this study represent a lower-bound for the effects of the 
Detection/Consequence warning, as well as further examine the effect of the Reasoning 
warning on responding.  
In order to better assess why I found no significant differences between group 
means for the measures of procedural justice, it would be beneficial to expand this study 
to include a cognitive test. With a cognitive test (or some other component of a selection 
battery), there could be a condition in which the applicant takes no personality test. Such 
a design would enable the researcher to examine if it is merely the presence of a 
46 
personality test that affects the applicant’s perception of procedural justice, as in 
McFarland (2003).   
Conclusion 
This study answered Dwight et al.’s (2003) call for researchers to explore the 
effect of the integration of warnings into the selection process, providing three main 
additions to the personality literature. The central purposes of this study were to examine 
if the reasoning warning would be as effective as the Detection/Consequence warning in 
reducing applicant faking behavior, as well as examine if the Reasoning warning was 
more applicant-friendly in terms of procedural justice. The study adds to the wide range 
of research on applicant faking behavior by being the first to compare a 
detection/consequence warning to both faked and honest responses. Furthermore, it was 
the first to compare the effectiveness of the reasoning warning to both faked and honest 
responses, as well as responses obtained under a detection/consequence warning. Perhaps 
researchers have not studied alternative warnings to reduce applicant faking behavior 
because the Detection/Consequence warning is quite effective (at least within the 
selection context). In this study, a reasoning warning did not elicit mean trait scores that 
were significantly less socially desirable than faked responses. The reasoning warning 
appears to be inappropriate within this selection context, but still may show promise for 
other contexts (e.g. classification). Finally, my results suggest that explaining to 
respondents the purpose for including a personality test in the selection battery, as done 
through a reasoning warning, has no impact on respondent perceptions of procedural 
justice. 
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Appendix A 
International Personality Item Pool Items* 
1. Often feel blue 
2. Feel comfortable around people 
3. Am not interested in abstract ideas 
4. Have a sharp tongue 
5. Am always prepared 
6. Dislike myself 
7. Have little to say 
8. Believe in the importance of art 
9. Cut others to pieces 
10. Pay attention to details 
11. Rarely get irritated 
12. Make friends easily 
13. Do not like art 
14. Have a good word for everyone 
15. Waste my time 
16. Am often down in the dumps  
17. Keep in the background 
18. Have a vivid imagination 
19. Believe that others have good intentions 
20. Find it difficult to get down to work 
21. Have frequent mood swings 
22. Am skilled in handling social situations 
23. Avoid philosophical discussions 
24. Suspect hidden motives in others 
25. Get chores done right away 
26. Seldom feel blue 
27. Would describe myself as somewhat dull 
28. Tend to vote for liberal political candidates 
29. Get back at others 
30. Carry out my plans 
31. Feel comfortable with myself 
32. Am the life of the party 
33. Do not enjoy going to art museums 
34. Respect others 
35. Do just enough work to get by 
36. Panic easily 
37. Don’t like to draw attention to myself 
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Appendix A (Continued) 
 
38. Carry the conversation to a higher level 
39.Accept people as they are 
40. Don’t see things through 
41. Am not easily bothered by things 
42. Know how to captivate people 
43. Tend to vote for conservative political candidates 
44. Insult people 
45. Make plans and stick to them 
46. Am very pleased with myself 
47. Don’t talk a lot 
48. Enjoy hearing new ideas 
49. Make people feel at ease 
50.  Shirk my duties 
* Goldberg et al. (2006) 
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Appendix B 
Procedural Justice Questionnaire Items* 
1. Have you been able to express your views and feelings during these procedures? 
2. Have you had an influence over the outcome arrived at by these procedures? 
3. Have these procedures been applied consistently? 
4. Have these procedures been free of bias? 
5. Have these procedures been based on accurate information? 
6. Do you feel able to appeal the outcome arrived at by these procedures? 
7. Have these procedures upheld ethical and moral standards? 
 
* adapted from Colquitt (2001) 
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Appendix C 
Selection Procedural Justice Scale Items* 
1. Doing well on this test means a person can do the nursing job well. 
2. A person who scored well on this test will be a good nurse. 
3. I could really show my skills and abilities through this test. 
4. This test allowed me to show what my job skills are. 
5. This test gives applicants the opportunity to show what they can really do. 
6. I was able to show what I can do on this test. 
7. The content of the test did not appear to be prejudiced. 
8. The test itself did not seem too personal or private. 
9. The content of the test seemed appropriate. 
10. It would be clear to anyone that this test is related to the nursing job. 
11. The content of the test was clearly related to the nursing job. 
 
* adapted from Bauer at al. (2001) 
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Appendix D 
Impression Management Scale* 
1. I sometimes tell lies if I have to  
2. I never cover up my mistakes 
3. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone 
4. I never swear 
5. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget 
6. I always obey laws, even if I’m unlikely to get caught 
7. I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back 
8. When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening 
9. I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or her 
10. I always declare everything at customs 
11. When I was young I sometimes stole things 
12. I have never dropped litter on the street 
13. I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit 
14. I never read sexy books or magazines 
15. I have done things that I don’t tell other people about 
16. I never take things that don’t belong to me 
 17. I have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I wasn’t really sick 
18. I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise without reporting it 
19. I have some pretty awful habits 
20. I don’t gossip about other people’s habits 
 
* Paulhus (1991) 
